

Shift towards Bolsheviks among Sevastopol workers and far left in “Southern Russia” during the French intervention in 1918–1919

Denis DENISOV

Doctorant en Histoire

École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (FR)

denisov.denis@ehess.fr

Doi : [10.5077/journals/connexe.2021.e532](https://doi.org/10.5077/journals/connexe.2021.e532)

Résumé

Cet article décrit et analyse l'évolution des préférences politiques des **ouvriers de Sébastopol** durant l'intervention française (novembre 1918–mai 1919). Après avoir brièvement présenté une vue d'ensemble du paysage social de la cité portuaire durant la Guerre civile russe, il s'agira de se pencher sur les interactions entre ouvriers, marins étrangers et partis politiques. Cet article a pour objectif d'étudier la bolchévisation du milieu ouvrier de Sébastopol à partir des parcours de plusieurs ouvriers locaux. De la distribution de tracts révolutionnaires jusqu'à l'agitation dans les cafés, les cantines, et les usines, en passant par de nombreuses autres activités illégales, quelles ont été les tactiques des bolcheviks pour rallier les ouvriers locaux à leur cause ?

Mots-clés : Sébastopol, ouvriers, bolcheviks, Guerre civile russe, intervention française.

Abstract

This article describes and analyses shifts in political preferences among **Sevastopol workers** during the French intervention (November 1918 – May 1919). After outlining the social landscape of the city during the Russian Civil War, this paper focuses on the interactions between workers, foreign sailors and political parties.

The aim of this article is to study the Bolshevisation of Sevastopol's working class based on the paths of several local workers. From the distribution of revolutionary leaflets to agitation in cafés, canteens and factories, and many other illegal activities, what were the Bolsheviks' tactics to rally local workers to their cause?

Keywords: Sevastopol, workers, Bolsheviks, Russian Civil War, French intervention.

In memory of my father, Vladimir Denisov, who passed away on 4 September 2017 in Sevastopol.

Introduction

The French Intervention in “Southern Russia”¹ [Юг России] (*Russie méridionale* in French sources), in 1918–1919 is still relatively underrepresented in the historiography of the final period (*sortie de guerre*) of the First World War (Audoin-Rouzeau; Prochasson 2008). Some French and Soviet researchers analyse these events from a strictly institutional point of view. The French historians represent these events from the point of view of the army (Bernachot 1970) and the navy (Masson 1982; Raphaël-Leygues and Barré 1981). The role and the representation of the Bolsheviks in these events were heavily distorted by the discourse of Soviet leaders at the time. Since 1982 there has been only one monograph devoted to this topic, which generally relies on André Marty’s sources (Perry 2019). Two recent articles on the topic were written by a French diplomat (Fieschi 2016) and a navy officer (Feron 2020).

This article introduces some new sources in French and Russian (sometimes duplicated in Ukrainian). It studies the interactions between the French intervention and the local revolutionary process from the point of view of local workers. This perspective is poorly integrated in Soviet historiography (which focuses on Odessa and notable figures such as Jeanne Labourbe) and discredited as part of a communist “myth”² in the Western tradition. Western historiography has focused on the further development of the Soviet state. In my work, I seek to readjust our optics in the light of sources covering the previous experiences of social groups, political parties and their activists in the city of Sevastopol in 1918–1919. Later changes should not be neglected. We have to keep in mind the reactionary context of the 1930s, as most of the sources we use were written in that time. However, should it conceal the revolutionary nature of the period these sources cover? Should we view Bolshevisation just as an exchange of the expertise of the new bureaucrats for the loyalty of local workers? In this study, I concentrate more on these locals.

As part of Allied intervention (*Entente*) decided by the French and British secret agreement of 23 December 1917 (Masson 1982, 16), French Intervention in Southern

1 Expression of the era. Most of these territories are in modern Ukraine. The Crimean Peninsula (where the city of Sevastopol is located) is controlled by the Russian Federation since 2014, but most of the UN member states consider it Ukrainian territory

2 This term is applied with all its ambiguity by scholars (Bouland, Penetier and Vaccaro 2005; Orr 2018; Perry 2020, 109) while non-scholars will undoubtedly read it as “lies”.

Russia started on 23 November 1918, when Allied ships first arrived in Sevastopol (Найда 1958, 93). The French leadership endorsed by the Allies was in charge not only of the French units and warships, but also the major English and Greek presence in this area. The intervention started after the Armistice on 11 November 1918. The French government believed that the Bolsheviks were being backed by the Germans so as to reinforce German diplomacy after the defeat of 1918.³ They were also aimed to protect French and Belgian business interests in the Donbass coal region, which controlled up to 82% of the capital in the mining and metallurgical industries (Бакулев 1955, 150; Зив 1917, 132), the commercial and logistical centre of Odessa, where *Crédit Lyonnais* had opened a first office in 1892 (Charon, Delmas and Le Goff 2012, 381) and the Nikolayev (Ukrainian *Mykolaïv*) shipyards.⁴ Both concerns were expressed publicly by Clemenceau in his interview with *Associated Press* published by *Le Figaro* on 10 February 1919 (“Inquiétudes de la France...” 1919, 1). The end of this military campaign was unique in many regards. It failed because of revolts among the French troops and the Navy, which reached their climax in April 1919, in the city of Sevastopol itself.

1. Sevastopol workers in the context of the Civil War

The bulk of the workers in Sevastopol was concentrated in the shipyards, which had up to 11,000⁵ or even 12,000 employees (Лысенко 1923, 16). There were some other relatively large groups of workers. According to the 1902 statistics, 1,172 people were employed or had a family member working in the Sevastopol railway station (Трегубов 1904, 137). The Railwaymen’s club was active in the time of the Civil War (Крестьянников 2005, 324). There were also dockers, cargo port personnel and local tramway employees. We can gauge their weight in the local population from the fact that the city of Sevastopol had 61,349 inhabitants in 1913 (Найда 1958, 9).

Workers’ living conditions in Sevastopol were not typical for the Southern economic region. They lived mostly in their own houses, and were much more connected to rural life (gardening etc.) and the countryside (Платонов 1925, 71–72; Соболев

³ *Letter of general Franchet-d’Espèrey to the commander in chief of allied armies of 24.11.1918*, Historical service of the [French Ministry of] Defence (SHD) 20 N 678.

⁴ The lists of creditors and shareholders of the Shipyards of Nikolaev joint-stock company show that the vast majority of them were French and Belgian individuals and companies. See: Russian Navy’s archives in Saint-Petersburg (РГАВМФ), ф. 512, оп. 2, д. 48; д. 49; д. 80, л. 45–57.

⁵ This may be the figure for the military port workers. See an explanation below in this article. [*Rozental’s*] *Memories (for the period from 1917 – year 1919)*, 1934, State Archive of the City of Sevastopol (ГАГС), ф. Р-391, оп. 2, д. 1., л. 6.

1925, 15).⁶ Their situation partly resembled the “Urals” model described by Lenin in his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (ЛЕНИН 1971, 484–488). The history of shipbuilding in Sevastopol began at the time of the founding of the city under Catherine II, who continued the development of the military industry initiated in the time of Peter I, with massive use of forced labour of peasants and sailors (Мурзу 2011).

Note that there was a special symbiotic relationship between the workers of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet. Most shipyard workers were remarkably familiar with the interiors of warships, and their work provided plenty of opportunities to communicate with sailors, for instance during the construction of the battleship *Potemkin* (Кардашев 2008, 442) and the cruiser *Ochakov* (Брагинцев, Беседин and Кимбрович 1983, 45–47). Another aspect of their coexistence was the continual recruitment into the local working class of former sailors and soldiers from the very beginning of Sevastopol’s history (Третьубов 1904, 54; Мурзу 2011). The Navy played an important part in the life of local society, which increased even more in the revolutionary period. The Navy’s weight in local society was not only considerable in itself, but had also played a special role in the revolutionary period since 1905 (The *Potemkin* revolt, the November 1905 revolt in Sevastopol under Petr Schmidt’s leadership, Fleet commander Chukhnin’s assassination in 1906 and a revolutionary conspiracy in 1912 on board the battleship *Ioann Zlatoust*). It became a real revolutionary vanguard during the events of 1917 and was more radical than the workers.

These conditions changed drastically at the beginning of the Civil War. The February Revolution created a situation where the workers’ soviet and the sailors’ organisation Black Sea *Tsentroflot* shared their power with the municipal Duma (local authority in the late tsarist state). The Bolsheviks’ attempt to take power failed in 1918, and they even had to face a pro-Menshevik strike (Бунегин 1927, 154–155). Some memoirs mention “Menshevik parties”⁷ attacking the Bolshevik semi-official offices in 1917 and 1918, dissolving assemblies and destroying communist literature.⁸ From the very beginning of the revolution, this specific regime was understood as an *organised democracy*.⁹ When dealing with the city’s internal problems, it was relatively productive. But the economic issues threatened the very roots of this democracy. For example, the committee of a “Women citizens’ political club” created after the

6 Alexey Platonov’s description of the Sevastopol workers’ attachment to this lifestyle and their attitude to the Germans in 1918 (explained further in this article) may be compared to the Donbass workers’ fear of living in the countryside (Жуліков 2019, 215).

7 Here “parties” may mean “combat mobs” or the Mensheviks and all the political parties supporting them.

8 *Biography and Activity in an Underground-Partisan Work of a Citizen Paskhali, Kornei Georgievich*, State Archives of the Republic of Crimea (ГАРК), ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 624, л. 1–2.

9 [*Minutes and decisions of the meetings...*], ГАГС, КМФ-10, 1008, л. 2, *Meeting of the Gnevnyi destroyer’s crew. Ibid.*, л. 24, [*Minutes of*] *Executive committee of Sevastopol’s soviet of Military and worker’s deputies*.

February Revolution was forced to vote its own temporary suspension because of the general impoverishment and consequently a lack of active members at the end of 1917.¹⁰ The subsequent German occupation came as a complete shock to local workers when German forces entered the city on 1 May 1918 (Крестьянников 2005, 289). The Black Sea fleet, one of the revolution’s major social and political pillars in Sevastopol, partly destroyed by its sailors, partly disorganised, had ceased to exist by the summer of 1918 (Зарубин А. and Зарубин В. 2008, 349–350), depriving the shipyard of any orders. It was clearly the beginning of the end of *organised democracy*.

The French military intervention began just after the end of the German occupation. I prefer to distinguish between the terms used for these two periods because they correspond to the different images of the terrain that the German and the Allied commands had and that determined their different plans. The local population was seen as rather hostile by the Germans, so their occupation forces established a special local administration (Зарубин А. and Зарубин В. 2008, 364–365). The French intervention, in contrast, was seen by the Allied command as an action in support of an actual ally, the Russian empire, albeit one which under the Provisional Republican Government’s weakened control had in fact fallen apart. The local administration was believed to be relatively stable, with some legitimacy among the local population, generally loyal to the Entente despite significant Bolshevik influence on the working class. This view was expressed in the *Guideline on a Mission in Russia for Franchet d’Espèrey*, a document issued by Clémenceau on 21 November 1918 (Masson 1982, 541).

In the local context of Crimea at the time, this administration was represented by the Second Regional Government of Solomon Krym and Denikin’s Volunteer Army. But Krym’s government (based in Simferopol) was too weak (Зарубин А. and Зарубин В. 2008, 446) and the control of the local affairs was largely taken by the Volunteer Army, which was incompetent in civil administration. During this period, the local workers’ organisations of Sevastopol changed their attitude towards the Bolsheviks from wary and rather negative to a positive one.

These changes were brought about by shifts in the political situation which affected workers’ preferences. We can see that workers shared Bolshevik hostility to the First World War, but in 1917 they supported a solution offered by Kautsky and Martov which can be described as a revolutionary *defensism* aiming at a conditional peace that would respect national interests.¹¹

¹⁰ [Minutes of the meetings of the committee for the “Women citizens’ political club”], ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, л. 35, л. 81–81 об.

¹¹ As opposed to a spontaneous “defeatism” among the workers and national minorities. See: [Minutes of the Sevastopol Soviet], ГАРС, КМФ-10 (microfilms), 988, л. 1–5.

Local public opinion was generally on the side of the Provisional government representing this line in foreign affairs and supporting the Allies (if reluctantly) whose arrival was officially announced and was palpable in the context of the November revolution in Germany, the Armistice and the preparations for the German withdrawal from Sevastopol. Here are two extracts from a newspaper, *Iuzhnye Vedomosti* [Southern journal] of 11 October 1918 covering two public debates about the Allied Intervention of 2 November 1918:

Meeting in the Summer theatre (800 persons):

“C.[itizens] Nemirov, Gallop and Margolin spoke on behalf of the council of the trade unions [...] There was also at this meeting a [Navy’s] sailor Fedor Batkin¹² who developed an idea of the necessity to use the future arrival of the Allies, who are bringing liberty to Russia, in order to proceed with them to rescue Russia from the Bolsheviks. [...] Nemirov doubted the democratism of the Allies. In the speaker’s opinion neither Bolsheviks nor Allies would save Russia, and Russia’s renaissance is possible only [on the basis] of the Russian democracy’s own forces”

Meeting in the Workers’ Club (1 000 persons):

“Two motions were voted on: the Bolsheviks’ motion, which demanded to acclaim the October Coup and to create the Soviet of the worker’s deputies in Crimea and the one [in favor of the Provisional government] of the Crimean Trade Unions’ Council. The motion of the Trade Unions’ Council was adopted by the overwhelming majority with 52 votes against and 16 abstained”.¹³

Another factor was the degradation of living conditions. First, inflation due to the instability of multiple local currencies (Рябченко 2006; Шуст 2009). Unemployment was rising: according to *Priboy* (a Menshevik newspaper) (28 February 1919) there were 13 000 unemployed in the city, including 8 000 of the 8 600 members of the metal workers’ union, and 80% unemployed in the construction workers’ union (Крестьянников 2005, 322). Note that the terms of the collective agreement at the shipyard were disregarded.

At the end of 1918, the shipyards were separated from the military port as an independent enterprise. It applied to its workers a rather detailed and sound collective agreement. Although it was not a real expression of their hopes, it provided at least a certain framework for their relations with their employer.¹⁴ Andrey Lysenko, secretary of the bureau of the Sevastopol trade unions (a sort of central confederation body if we interpret it in terms of French syndicalism), sent two official letters of protest against

¹² In fact, Batkin was not a real Navy sailor but an agent of former Fleet commander Kolchak (Смолин 2012, 163–164). Still, his arguments should be read with a subsequent report of the meeting at the workers’ club.

¹³ РГАСПИ, ф. 71, оп. 35, д. 952, л. 172–173.

¹⁴ [Constitutional documents of the Arsenal of Sevastopol], ГАГС, ф. Р-253, оп. 1, д. 1, л. 214–250 (об.), *Collective Agreement*.

the discontinuation of workers’ health insurance.¹⁵

The first wildcat strikes (purely about pay) took place in January 1919 among the dockers (Masson 1982, 284). On 7 March, *Priboy* was closed down by the authorities for publishing critical materials on working conditions. The same day a meeting of 500 workers at the *Truzzi* circus voted for a political strike against famine and “the weakness of the Volunteer Army and other unknown governments” (Зарубин А. and Зарубин В. 2008, 467). Also on 7 March, the French command closed the Railway men’s club. On 8 March, a commemoration on 12 March of the second anniversary of the February revolution was banned (Крестьянников 2005, 325).¹⁶ As a result, a general strike began on 13 March, uniting almost all the workers in Sevastopol. As the workers’ involvement in the strikes grew, the French command had no option but to increase the workload of its sailors.

2. Interactions: Local workers, French sailors and political parties

Here we come to the crucial question of the interaction between local workers and the French sailors and soldiers. The dockers’ strikes forced French Navy sailors to perform more coal loading work (Masson 1982, 287). This seemed to exclude any direct interaction between local workers and French sailors. In reality, however, interaction was inevitable. The shipyard received fourteen orders from the French command, worth 149 316.49 rubles and one order from the Greek command worth 542.40 rubles, making a total of 149 858.89 rubles payable by 27 April 1919,¹⁷ (i.e. before the end of the Intervention). The most significant example of such an interaction was the salvage and repair of the battleship *Mirabeau*, which had run aground on entering Sevastopol bay on 8 February 1918. This may be classified as professional interaction.

Another type of interaction may be defined as accidental or spontaneous. André Marty, an active participant in the Black sea revolt and one of its first historians, subsequently a notable French communist, quoted in his book many letters written by the Black Sea mutineers describing these interactions. This went from fraternisation, for example with the Red Cossacks in Mariupol or with the inhabitants of Odessa (Marty 1949, 272, 424), to a complex and touching scene in which the French sailors helped local girls from poor families collect potatoes that had fallen during the unloading of a French cargo at Sevastopol. When two sergeants of the French colonial infantry who were around tried to prevent this “theft”, they were stopped and shamed by a group of French sailors on duty (Marty 1949, 272).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, л. 52–52 (об.), 194–194 (об.), *Letters of Lysenko*.

¹⁶ Artillery and machineguns were deployed on the streets.

¹⁷ *Summary Report*, ГАГС, ф. Р-253, Оп. 2, д. 1, л. 57.

It is important to bear in mind that all these interactions were amplified by the regular circulation of French warships between the two major centres of the French presence in “Southern Russia”, Odessa and Sevastopol. We can see how the events in Odessa influenced the French sailors and soldiers in Sevastopol. For example, French soldiers in Odessa took unauthorised leave to make home visits. Here is a description of such a visit by a soldier in a Bolshevik French-language newspaper, *Le Communiste*, edited by a “Foreign Collegium”, an underground far-left organisation in Odessa consisting mostly of Bolshevik activists.¹⁸ Their experience in Odessa made a great impact on the minds of the soldiers.

One of the *Mirabeau*'s mutinous sailors, Moreau, told the ship's commander Revault that he and his comrades had been “warmly welcomed” in Sevastopol (Revault 1981, 204), although it is hard to tell whether he was referring to the same practice of home visits as in Odessa.

As we can see, this type of interaction is hard to distinguish from an organised interaction. The Foreign Collegium, mainly based in Odessa, was the most important group engaging with French soldiers and sailors.¹⁹ It was not the only group of this type, but it had considerable support from Moscow, from other communist French-language media like the newspaper *3^{ème} Internationale* and from French radio messages broadcast by the Soviets. Some notable members of this group had been sent directly from Moscow, such as the French citizen Jeanne Labourbe. Not least was the role of former political working-class emigrants among the far-left activists in Sevastopol.

Probably the most important person for our study at the Foreign Collegium was Alexandre “Khromoi” (“the lame”) [Vapel'nik](#). Vapel'nik opened a humble canteen on Iekaterininskya Street, Sevastopol, under the Germans in 1918. He spoke German well enough to agitate among the soldiers of the occupation corps. He had also fought in the First World War in the ranks of the Foreign Legion (1st foreign regiment) and was even awarded the 3rd Class St. George's Cross in 1915 according to *Journal officiel de la République française* of 13 April 1915 (“*Concession de décorations russes...*” 1915, 2171–2174).²⁰ In December 1918, he helped set up the Foreign Collegium. Still, he was depicted as an independent activist by Vladimir Elin, brother of Iakov “Zhak”/“Jacques” Elin, one of the Collegium's leaders who had also been a political *émigré* in France (B.

¹⁸ “Nous sommes des ouvriers [We are workers],” *Le Communiste* # 2, л. 1. Museum of Odessa National Scientific library.

¹⁹ There were other groups. There are two documents of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs). The second one is a leaflet of Ukrainian SRs for French soldiers and sailors. [*Sevastopol*] *Left Socialists-Revolutionaries proclamation against any support of Volunteer Army*, ГАГС, ф. Р-557, оп. 1, д. 1. *Camarades ouvriers, paysans et tous les presés* (sic – D.D.), *de qui est composée l'armée française tout entière !*, State Archive of Odessa Region, (ДАОО), ф. П-2, оп. 1, д. 557.

²⁰ Original spelling: “Vapelnick”.

ЕЛИН 1921, 10). According to this evidence, Vapel'nik had very few relations with the Odessa group. His specialisation during the intervention was to work with the soldiers. He left Sevastopol in January 1919 to hide in Yevpatoria and then in Odessa, but he was arrested and murdered by the Whites on 8 March.²¹ Of particular importance was agitation in canteens and cafés. Eugène Lefort, whose memories were collected by Marty, described a discussion with a local “red” inhabitant in a Sevastopol café, which was interrupted by a Greek soldier or officer threatening them with a revolver.²² The same practices of agitation were largely applied in Odessa. Soviet historian Konovalov mentioned a restaurant “Dardanelly” (“*Dardanelles*”) opened by an emissary from Stalin and Atriom (Sergeyev), Martyn Loladze, to provide the Foreign Collegium with a legal base for activity in Odessa (Коновалов 1958, 33–34).

The case of Iakov “Zhan”/“Jean” Gorodetskii is even more eloquent. He was one of the founders of the social-democratic movement in Crimea and a head of the local underground revolutionary committee formed during the Allied intervention. In 1910, he emigrated to Paris after a series of trials, arrests and exiles. After his return he participated in the Civil War and was sent to Sevastopol from Moscow in 1918 (Зарубин А. and Зарубин В. 2008, 498; Политическая каторга и ссылка 1934, 158). According to Lysenko, he was also responsible for producing leaflets in French (Лысенко 1923, 24). His emigration experience consisted in actively learning about the French social movement tradition and multinational action. In March 1913, he led a strike of Russian tailors in the *Galleries Lafayette* (he was elected president of the strike committee at the meeting of 7 March) according to the documents of the French police in the *Archives nationales*. The police report of the meetings transcribed his name incorrectly — “Goordski” — because these meetings were held mostly in Russian²³ (still, there is no “Goordski” mentioned in any relevant report). Some further reports mention “assistants” interpreting from Russian into French.²⁴

This problem of the language barrier in 1913 gave Gorodetskii a unique experience of international action that he used six years later. The employers of the *Galleries* took advantage of the communication problems among their workers. They deliberately misinterpreted some parts of the correspondence between the workers on strike that was sent by the *Galleries*' pneumatic tube to eighteen strike-breakers. This was turned into a rumour that the real intention behind the strike was to evict all the

²¹ [Memories of Ruman-Poliakov] РГАСПИ, ф. 70, оп. 3, д. 499, л. 3–5.

²² Eugène Lefort, *Souvenirs sur les événements de la Mer Noire*, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis, AM 281J IV E1.8. Cit. ex: Perry, Matt. 2019 *Mutinous memories...* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

²³ [Strike of 27 February – 13 March 1913 in the Galleries Lafayette], Archives nationales, Fonds du ministère de l'Intérieur, AN F7 13881, Dossier “Habillement”, sous-dossier “Grève des *Galleries Lafayette*”, [7 March 1913. Police report on a Meeting of 6 March 1913].

²⁴ *Ibid.*, [9 March 1913. Police report on a Meeting of 8 March 1913].

French workers from the *Galeries*. In fact, the workers on strike openly mentioned a possibility of including in the strike’s demands the dismissal of those colleagues who refused to join the movement. The rumour was disavowed publicly during the meeting of 10 March.²⁵ The assistants in charge of the French translation, along with some notable French tailor union figures such as Pierre Dumas, were there to persuade their French comrades not to believe the rumour. The hypothesis about “Goordski” is also confirmed by the documents of the French Navy. In the report of the negotiations with the revolutionary committee, Admiral Amet remarked that the committee’s president spoke French fluently due to his long presence on French soil as a tailor in Lyon and the *Galeries Lafayette* in Paris.²⁶

This latter type of interaction between the French and the locals might be defined simply as propaganda work. But in fact, all the regular Bolshevik activists had a vast pool of support which made this organised communication possible, even after the key members of the Foreign Collegium had been murdered by the Whites (Marty 1949, 184–206) and even after the arrest of Gorodetskii in mid-March 1919.²⁷ Konovalov claims that there were 199 people helping the Odessa group in one way or another (КОНОВАЛОВ 1960, 11). We can refer to some specific cases in Sevastopol.

One of the most interesting was that of a young Jewish worker and “Socialist union of the working youth” activist, Rozental’. At the very end of his brief autobiography, he spoke about distributing to French sailors leaflets in French that he had received from the underground activist Starosel’skaiaa. This brief encounter was not an exception in his activist practice as he had discussions in the “Jewish language” (i.e., Yiddish), with German soldiers during the German occupation, although the topic of the discussions is unknown. Before the Intervention, he was working in the ironworks workshop of the shipyard. He had literally “dreamt of” this work because before the February revolution of 1917, Jews had not been allowed in the military ports as they were considered unreliable for work in a military enterprise. He had to work in private workshops “for chicken feed” from age ten, after finishing a charity Jewish school. In 1917, Rozental’ read newspapers and pamphlets to his colleagues in the workshop every afternoon, on behalf of his youth group. In November 1917, he was admitted to the metal workers’ union.²⁸

A brief autobiography of Starosel’skaia shows that, despite Rozental’s remark, she was not at all a French-speaking activist but a Bolshevik supporter who was valuable

²⁵ *Ibid.*, [10 March 1913. Police report on a Meeting of 10 March 1913].

²⁶ *Compte rendu de l’entrevue de l’amiral avec le président du comité révolutionnaire de Sébastopol le 20 avril 1919*, SHD, M SS A 173, Dossier « Forces navales », sous-dossier « 2° ESCADRE DIDEROT [et] JEAN BART ».

²⁷ [*Semonov’s memories*], ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 701, л. 45.

²⁸ [*Rozental’ ’s*] *Memories* [...], ГАРК, ф. Р-391, оп. 2, д. 1, л. 4.

for another purpose. The sister of a Bolshevik, Aron Starosel'skii, she trained to be a maternity nurse, thus obtaining a special status that enabled her to use her basket of professional equipment and clothing to transport leaflets.²⁹

Korneï Paskhali was a shipyard worker in the electrical and mechanical workshop. According to his memoirs, collected on 8 May 1929, he fought the Germans in spring 1918 but after the defeat of the Reds he was evacuated to Novorossiysk with his comrades. Interestingly, Paskhali claimed that he was evacuated on a French ship *Musel'* (this may have been *Moselle*). Being a pro-Bolshevik activist, he received a mission to return to Sevastopol (but not as a party member, as he is called “citizen”, not “comrade” in the documents of *Istpart*). “In the days of the February revolution of 1919” (February’s second anniversary), he was arrested while distributing leaflets among the Entente soldiers, near the Admiral Nakhimov monument. He was immediately taken to the officers’ club, where they failed to find in his pocket several leaflets in Greek and a “stripper clip with rounds for a *Steyr* revolver” (which shows his lack of experience because carrying stripper clips without a handgun makes little sense). Fortunately for Paskhali, he met a senior lieutenant there, an engineering officer from the cruiser *Almaz*, who had known Paskhali as a repair worker at the shipyard.

He let Paskhali go without making thorough enquiries. Being of Greek descent, Paskhali probably intended to agitate among and communicate with both Greek troops and the relatively numerous Greek community in Sevastopol. He participated in a Greek community delegation to the French flagship, the dreadnaught *Jean-Bart*, in April 1919. This delegation negotiated the possibility of evacuating the local Greeks who feared the vengeance of the Reds, as the Greek infantry was more numerous among the Allied forces on the ground, and had fought the Reds much less reluctantly than the French. Paskhali claimed that he took part in this delegation to gather information for his comrades.³⁰

But was this involvement natural and clearly motivated from the beginning for all workers? Rozental’ recalled that he participated actively in the Sevastopol soviet from the very outset, i.e. even during the period when it was dominated by the Mensheviks. He was also involved with the armed security squads created in 1918 with the Germans’ consent to protect the fleet’s stock of weapons jointly with the Germans.³¹ This enthusiastic but chaotic atmosphere was also represented in the memories of another socialist youth union member, Matveev, who depicted a typical audience of the 1917’s meetings clapping and cheering after every speech, despite the fact that the speechmakers expressed sometimes opposing ideas in the name

²⁹ [Starosel'skaia's Memories], ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 729, л. 1, 1 об.

³⁰ *Biography and Activity [...] of a Citizen Paskhali [...]*, ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 624, л. 1–2.

³¹ [Rozental' 's] *Memories [...]*, ГАГС, ф. Р-391, оп. 2, д. 1, л. 6.

of different tendencies.³² The question is, why did the workers shift their support to the Bolsheviks? An examination of the events of the French intervention period can provide an answer.

3. Bolshevisation of Sevastopol workers in 1919

We find a concentrated expression of the crisis of *organised democracy* in the memoirs of Ivan Semënov, a Left Socialist Revolutionary who cooperated closely with the Bolsheviks from the very end of the pre-war Era (at least since 1913) and made several journeys between Sevastopol and Moscow during the Civil War. Six days after his return to Sevastopol from Moscow, he took part in a workers’ meeting in the *Truzzi* circus, on 9 March, to debate a “collective agreement” negotiated by a Menshevik delegation with Solomon Krym’s government. The Menshevik leaders promised that large sums would be transferred from the Don, to pay back the workers’ life savings and arrears as well as future wages. But Semënov argued in favour of politically conscious solidarity with the Red Army fighters and insurgent Ukrainian peasants struggling against the Whites and the Allies on the Perekop isthmus. He mentioned some of the military production of the shipyard that could be used against the local workers’ class brothers. But he also stressed the importance of producing agricultural instruments and machines badly desired by starving peasantry. He defeated the Mensheviks by bringing these two arguments together.³³

It is necessary to point out here a notable change in the balance of forces. According to Semënov, some important Menshevik militants joined the Bolsheviks. Some of them, for example Samorukov, were even killed during Denikin and Wrangel’s rule in Crimea. Another, Pivovarov, was in charge of the so-called “self-defence” of Sevastopol, which was armed by the French command, and tasked with ensuring a minimum degree of order in daily life. But once he started to carry out his duties, he accepted the Bolshevik revolutionary committee’s demand to control the arms distribution so that “French rifles” did not fall into the hands of the unreliable. Was it a result of threats? At least, according to Semënov, it was Pivovarov who hinted that the Revolutionary committee might have faced problems if it were to let him down. With the consent of Pivovarov responsible for the city’s self-defence, the revolutionary committee organised it into a unit of 800 riflemen loyal to the Bolsheviks. In his memoirs Semënov stated that Pivovarov was working in Moscow in the 1930’s.³⁴

Mikhail Nikolaev was described by a former journalist on the Menshevik *Priboi*

³² Matveev, G. M., *Under revolution’s banner (notes of a Black sea sailor)*, ГАРС, ф. Р-391, оп. 4, д. 8, л. 16–17.

³³ [Semonov’s memories], ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 701, л. 43.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, л. 47.

and editorial board member of the official city newspaper *Maiaak kommuny* [Commune's Beacon], on 19 January 1928 for the local *Istpart*. Nikolaev had been a “straight and honest” workers’ leader, a Menshevik, highly appreciated by his party comrades. By the end of 1918, he had changed his political allegiances and ceased attending Menshevik meetings. There were rumours of his cooperation with the Bolshevik underground. Nikolaev was murdered in his home by the Whites at the end of 1919 on account of these rumours.³⁵ Gerasim Vorkin, a blacksmith in the Military Port, had been an active participant in the 1905–1907 Revolution, an old SR elected as a workers’ representative to the “first democratic Duma” in Sevastopol in 1917. He had shifted his views progressively since the beginning of 1918. At first, he joined the Left SRs, but “he worked briefly with them and left [them] for the Bolsheviks upon the arrival of the Whites he evacuated to Ukraine”. It is hard to know which arrival of the Whites is referred to. Still, it is clearly distinguished from the German or French presence, so his shift towards the Bolsheviks might have taken place during the French intervention or the German occupation, or in the first Soviet period.³⁶ We may also mention Moisey Krivokhizha, an unskilled worker in the shipyard’s boiler shop since 1906 and member of a consumer co-operative’s executive committee. He joined the Bolsheviks in March 1919.³⁷

Another example was Andrei Lysenko, who was working in the apparatus of the Soviets. In a memoir from 1923, he claimed that he was involved in the Left SR Party, the Bolsheviks’ main ally at the outset of the Civil War. In fact, he had taken some anti-Bolshevik decisions in September 1917 in his capacity as secretary of the soviet’s executive committee (Лысенко 1923, 15, 18). In 1919, he had become president of the metal workers’ union and had formulated some of the workers’ economic demands.³⁸ At the same time, as Semënov showed, his position enabled him to participate directly in transferring power to the Soviets, once the French intervention had come to an end.³⁹ As we shall see, Lysenko played a part not only in the strike and further interactions between French sailors and local workers, but also in the subsequent writing of the history of these episodes.

The strike of the metal workers began on 10 March. The next day, the trade union bureau elected a strike committee and an executive committee composed of Gorodetskii, Semënov and other Bolshevik or pro-Bolshevik activists. As a result,

³⁵ [Garkushenko, V. I.] Notice, ГАГС, ф. P-391, оп. 1, д. 40, л. 1.

³⁶ Lebedev, M. I., *Keep their banner*, ГАГС, ф. P-391, оп. 1, д. 36, л. 28–37.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, л. 74.

³⁸ [Constitutional documents of the Arsenal of Sevastopol], ГАГС, ф. P-253, Оп. 1, д. 1, л. 52–52 (об.), 194–194 (об.), *Letters of Lysenko*.

³⁹ [Semonov's memories], ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 701, л. 47.

according to Semënov, repair work on the *Mirabeau* stopped.⁴⁰ To explain the reasons for the involvement of the *Mirabeau*'s crew, a delegation including the workers' activist Goriachko and the Russian-French interpreter Beliavtsev was sent to represent the unions. Goriachko said that the workers did not want to stop the repair work completely but were protesting against French interference in local affairs, which represented a violation of the principles initially adopted by the French command (Masson 1982, 541). In response, the French sailors showed their calloused wrists and palms to the delegation (this gesture generally meant brotherhood in labour), declaring that they were also Bolsheviks.⁴¹

Goriachko, in his memoirs, described this event differently. According to him, there was no request from the sailors but an invitation from the “commander” to negotiate the issue. Goriachko stated that after explaining the workers' demands, the “commander” brought the sailors together on the *Mirabeau*'s forecastle to explain the same thing as in Semënov's version, but with no hand showing scene.⁴² One strange thing about Goriachko's evidence was that he mentioned the “commander” as an interpreter in his dialogue with the sailors, with Beliavtsev simply ensuring that the interpretation was correct. It is rather unlikely that the *Mirabeau*'s commander Revault had any knowledge of Russian. In his writings, Revault referred to the French-Russian interpreter, Albert Nicolet, officially an artilleryman, “*quartier-mâitre réserviste*”, a rank which could not make him pass for a commander (Revault 1981, 214). However, Revault confirmed that there was a workers' delegation composed of Drozdov, Lysenko, Goriachko and Beliavtsev, who visited the ship on 12 March, and that he was present and took part in the discussion. This delegation had a list of four political demands:

- 1) The same social organisation as in “Central Russia”;
- 2) Complete evacuation of the Volunteer Army from Crimea;
- 3) An end to repressions against workers;
- 4) An end to the interference of the French command in local affairs.

If these demands were met, the delegation pledged to resume the repair work (Revault 1981, 165–167). Note that there was another team under engineer Sidensner which continued working after 11 March (Revault 1981, 167). Therefore, at first, the strike involved only engineer Constantinov's team. Still, its absence from work was an issue for the French command.

I believe that Andrey Lysenko was responsible for imagining the legendary Goriachko's riposte to Revault quoted by Andre Marty in his book (Marty 1949, 179):

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, л. 44.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, л. 45. We find the same scenes in Marty's book (Marty 1949, 166).

⁴² [Goriachko's *Memories...*], ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 335, л. 1.

that *Mirabeau*'s revolutionary spirit had caused the shipwreck of a battleship named after him but directed against another revolution (ЛЫСЕНКО 1923, 23). The credibility of Goriachko's and Semënov's accounts might be doubted on account of the mass repressions of the 1930s. Lysenko wrote his memoirs in 1923, while Goriachko and Semënov wrote their texts in 1935 and 1934 respectively. It is true that Goriachko was much more laconic in his memoirs than all the other participants in this conversation.⁴³ But Lysenko's version stands in complete contradiction to Revault's. Revault stated that he was not aware of the workers' delegation waiting for engineer Constantinov's visit or Constantinov's response to Revault's letter, while in Lysenko's version, Constantinov was present among the delegates. It also describes the visit of the worker's delegation to the captain's cabin (with tea, wine and sweets on the table) with two French interpreters and almost all the officers present, and the captain's great eloquence in addressing his crew —an account which contradicts Semënov's version and is not confirmed by Revault's text. Revault insisted that he took little part in the conversation (ЛЫСЕНКО 1923, 23–24; Revault 1981, 167). Still, Lysenko's account confirms some general topics of these negotiations, such as the halt of the repair work on the *Mirabeau* in the event of a general strike, and the issue of French interference. Lysenko wrote that leaflets in French, English and even Arabic were distributed from the very start of the repair work (ЛЫСЕНКО 1923, 22–25).

On 14 March, the work resumed (Revault 1981, 168). According to Semënov, the next day, some French sailors visited the metal workers union's office, asking for communist literature. There was no such literature there, but the sailors had a conversation with some union members with Beliavtsev's assistance, and some leaflets were written, printed and distributed later.⁴⁴ On 16 March, the strike on the *Mirabeau* restarted and lasted almost a week, until 21 March, when the workers finally went back to work (Revault 1981, 180). Meanwhile the strike movement had expanded into parts of the city's economy. As a result, as Revault wrote in his report of 9 April 1919, the *Mirabeau*'s crew had to manage two crane ships on their own from 16 March until the repairs were completed, and they dismantled even more armour plates on their battleship than the workers did the same day: 889 and 636 tons respectively (Revault 1981, 187).

This moment was crucial for the political situation in Sevastopol. This mass shift towards the Bolsheviks encompassed a wide range of personal attitudes (some sincere, some opportunistic) among the workers. It was summed up in a letter from a member of the Sevastopol regional committee of the SRs to the Southern bureau of his party: “A part of workers biased against the Bolsheviks stands nevertheless for the strike,

⁴³ Just two pages of his memoirs describe this delegation.

⁴⁴ [Semonov's memories], ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, л. 701, л. 45.

considering that its spearhead is directed against the Volunteer army.⁴⁵

It had become clear that the city would inevitably pass to the Soviets. This happened a month later. Despite the fact that on 17 April the French command signed an agreement with the commander of the First Soviet Ukrainian Division, the famous Pavel Dybenko, that authorised the transfer of power to the revolutionary committee on 19 April (Bernachot 1970, 400–401), by 20 April the city of Sevastopol was full of Greek and French troops. In fact, during the negotiations, the French command changed its position regarding total evacuation and demanded the right to let the ships remain in the Bay of Sevastopol despite the evacuation of the army units (Masson 1982, 234–236). This conflict was resolved by the protests of the French crews, who were roused primarily against the increase in their duty services, especially the loading of coal and the ban on shore leave. The sailors’ protest began after they sang the Internationale on the evening of 19 April.

The next day a large group of sailors ignored the orders of their commanding officers and went ashore. They took part in a workers’ rally, which was attacked on Bolshaia Morskaia Street by French *fusiliers marins* from the flagship *Jean Bart* (Masson 1982, 264). Some Greek troops were also present and that resulted in some misunderstanding. We think that Masson’s version is correct as there is at least one Soviet source that describes an attack by French soldiers?⁴⁶ This Greek “myth” may be an unconscious concession to Franco-Soviet relations somehow comparable to the “error” about the murder of Luigi Trastulli during an anti-NATO rally of 1949 in Italy (Portelli 1991, 1–26). Its effect can be perceived throughout the memoirs of Paskhali, who distributed the leaflets on 20 April. Of Greek descent, he claimed that this attack was committed by the Greeks disguised as French sailors (sic!).⁴⁷

It is difficult to verify all the information we quote here from Soviet sources. Still, the multitude of details and the political risks taken by those who wrote these memoirs (references to non-Bolshevik activists, numerous in Semënov’s memoirs) in the early phase of the mass repressions make us think that the evidence they provide is probably reliable. Paskhali’s text was written in 1929 and Goriachko’s memoirs were sent to the library of *Istpart* on 11 April 1935.⁴⁸ The fact that the style of these texts is not very polished reflects a particular and hard-to-fake personal involvement especially in the case of Rozental’.

⁴⁵ *Letter from a Sevastopol regional committee’s member of the SR party to the Southern bureau of the party. March 1919, ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 49, л. 230.*

⁴⁶ [*Memories of Ruman-Poliakov*], РГАСПИ, Ф. 70, оп. 3, д. 499, л. 10.

⁴⁷ *Biography and Activity [...] of a Citizen Paskhali [...]*, ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 624, л. 2.

⁴⁸ [*Goriachko’s Memories*] *First underground after Revolution*, ГАРК, ф. П-150, оп. 1, д. 335, л. 1.

Conclusion

We believe that the key problem of “organised democracy” in Sevastopol was the bureaucratic nature of some of the democratic tendencies in the workers’ movement, as described by Marc Ferro (Ferro 1997, 765, 768). From Ferro’s perspective (taking Petrograd as a model), the Mensheviks’ attempt at bureaucratisation from above via the majority scheme in Sevastopol failed. But what was the Bolsheviks’ place in this structure?

Bureaucratisation was undoubtedly present in their actions (acting in some union bodies, negotiations, etc.). Still, the direction of this bureaucratisation is difficult to express in geometrical metaphors. The same action could be interpreted either emanating from above, as the action of highly qualified Bolshevik activists and their allies of the same profile (as it was the case of Gorodetskii, Semënov and Vapel’nik) or as coming from the Bolshevik and anti-White underground (Gorodetskii was arrested, Vapel’nik was killed). Some of the bureaucratic mechanisms used by the Bolsheviks cannot even be described in Ferro’s language of verticality in influencing SR and Menshevik militants (Lysenko, Nikolaev, Pivovarov, Samorukov, Vorkin and perhaps others). And even if we can distinguish some clear cases in their actions (bureaucratisation from below by gradual co-optation into the daily political responsibilities of workers like Paskhali and Rozental’), it is still impossible to reduce them to the rationale of bureaucratisation.

Although this revisionist explanation is much more adequate than the totalitarian one (which cannot and does not attempt to explain the democratic and emancipatory phenomena within Bolshevism as a massive co-optation of agitators, groups and tendencies into the Party during the Civil War), it still shares the same teleological points with the totalitarian discourse, merely prescribing a broader evolutionary horizon to the Bolsheviks than just Stalin’s personal dictatorship. However, this horizon was never broader than a set of possibilities given by subsequent Soviet and Post-Soviet leaders. In this article I have tried to give some elements to regard the Revolution and the Civil War history as that of a political and social struggle whose result was always uncertain without trying to suggest a better destiny for the countries and societies concerned. From this perspective, the Sevastopol episode was nothing more than an attempt to seize or retain the means of power of the time we are studying, a software package for a backward society highly militarised in three ways: the World War, Tsarist militarism and a city designed as a fortress.

The most important reason for this fragile local victory of the Bolsheviks —I have just described— was their coherent strategy, focusing on workers’ political initiative over institutions. It was simply difficult to maintain any institutional concept of a

revolutionary subject (such as *organised democracy*) when both the Germans and the Allies refused the Soviet institutions any legitimacy. There was no point in waiting for a formal reunification of the domestic democratic forces once common action with the foreigners became possible thanks to the strike movement provoked by the French command's attempt to mobilise the qualified workforce. The Bolsheviks within this movement were able to offer a vision to overcome a situation of perpetual war and social downgrading, which could appeal to both local workers and French sailors and soldiers.

In this sense, the French presence was not too different from the German one. Some important SR and Menshevik militants had already started to shift towards the Bolsheviks under the German occupation (Nikolaev and possibly Vorkin). The French intervention was interrupted because of local issues (for both foreign troops and local inhabitants), like the economy collapsing, and the general crisis in the homeland during the *sortie de guerre*, while for the Germans the latter factor obviously dominated the former. The individual activists who went over to the Bolsheviks under the Germans were joined under the French by some large institutional groups (trade unions and city's self-defence units, maybe cooperatives in the case of Krivokhizha and Duma factions in the case of Vorkin) and saw collective actions (strikes and rallies). Still the actual way the French intervention ended provided the Bolsheviks and their specific vision of the Soviet system with an exceptional legitimacy among local workers. It later played a major role in the Crimean working class resistance to the Denikin and Wrangel military dictatorship, and in the case of some former opponents (such as Nikolaev and Samorukov), their devotion cost them their lives.

At the same time, the workers' involvement sheds light on another aspect of these events. Even though their political situation was uncertain, they enjoyed some real power during the period of the Intervention (and even under the Germans). Once the construction of Soviet society started in 1917, it was not interrupted completely and persisted at least as a network of institutions and initiatives from below. The Bolsheviks were seen by the local working class as a force useful for such a construction in two ways:

- 1) They had a clear image of a political superstructure that at least fitted the new-born Soviet society better than any “unknown government” that just tolerated the workers' demands up to a point with the Mensheviks' mediation;
- 2) In the specific situation of the Allies' presence, the Bolsheviks provided throughout an *organised interaction* and regular communication with the French. They were even able to provide a sort of cultural interpretation, putting forward such militants as Gorodetskii or Vapel'nik.

Without this second factor the perception of the locals' strikes might have been different among the French sailors: Captain Revault, for example, preferred to see these as an expression of the inhabitants' natural laziness (Revault 1981, 187). In this case, a simple rejection of war could not have triggered the protests in Sevastopol. Most French historians (Bernachot, Masson, Raphaël-Leygues and Barré) consider the Revolt as a disciplinary crisis, generally caused by this *fatigue de guerre*. But our observations point to another explanation which may appear more realistic if we look at the Cilicia Campaign, the occupation of Constantinople or the French intervention in Hungary, where French soldiers and sailors did not protest against the War despite their fatigue.

Bibliographical references

- Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane, et Christophe Prochasson, éd. 2008. *Sortir de la Grande Guerre. Le monde et l'après 1918*. Paris : Tallandier.
- Bernachot, Jean. 1970. *Les armées françaises en Orient après l'armistice de 1918, T. II., Armée du Danube. Armée de l'Orient (28 octobre 1918 - 25 janvier 1920)*. Paris : Imprimerie nationale.
- Boulland, Paul, Claude Penetier et Rossana Vaccaro. 2005. *André Marty : l'homme, l'affaire, l'archive*. Montreuil : CODHOS Éditions.
- Charon, Annie, Bruno Delmas et Armelle Le Goff, éd. 2012. *La France et les Français en Russie : Nouvelles sources et approches (1815-1917)*. Paris : Publications de l'École nationale des chartes.
- Feron, Luc. 2020. « Les mutineries de 1919 ». *Marine & Forces navales* 184 : 64–79.
- Fieschi, Pascal. 2016. « L'intervention française à Odessa (décembre 1918 – mars 1919) vue à travers l'action du “Consul de France”, Emile Henno ». *Cahiers slaves* 14 : 161–172.
- Ferro, Marc. 1997. *La révolution de 1917*. Paris : Albin Michel.
- Masson, Philippe. 1982. *La Marine Française et la Mer Noire (1918-1919)*. Paris : Publications de la Sorbonne.
- Orr, Andrew. 2018. “The Myth of the Black Sea Mutiny: Communist Propaganda, Soviet Influence and the Remembering of the Mutiny.” *French History* 32 (1): 86–105.
- Perry, Matt. 2019. *Mutinous memories. A subjective history of a French military protest*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Perry, Matt. 2020. « Les mutineries de la mer Noire : 1919 et les origines du Parti communiste français ». *Le Mouvement Social* 272 (3) : 109–128.
- Portelli, Alessandro. 1991. *The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Raphaël-Leygues, Jacques et Jean-Luc Barré. 1981. *Les mutins de la mer Noire. Avril 1919 : des marins français se révoltent*. Paris : Plon.
- Revault, Hélène. 1981. *Le drame du cuirassé Mirabeau en Mer Noire février–mai 1919*. Angers : Imprimerie S.E.T.I.G. J. PALUSSIÉ.

- Багринцев, Н. В., А. Ф. Беседин, и Е. М. Кимбрович (ред.). 1983. *Корабелы Севастополя* [Shipbuilders of Sevastopol]. Ленинград: Судостроение.
- Бакулев, Г. Д. 1955. *Развитие угольной промышленности Донецкого бассейна* [Development of the coal industry in the coal-mining region of Donets]. Москва: Госполитиздат.
- Балахонов, Виктор. 1968. *Кавалер ордена почётного легиона* [Chevalier of the Legion of Honor]. Симферополь: Крым.
- Бунегин, Максим. 1927. *Революция в Крыму* [Revolution in Crimea]. Симферополь: Крымгосиздат.
- Зарубин, Александр, и Вячеслав Зарубин. 2008. *Без победителей. Из истории Гражданской войны в Крыму* [With no Winners. From the History of Civil War in Crimea]. Симферополь: АнтикВА.
- Зив, В. С. 1917. *Иностранные капиталы в русской горно-заводской промышленности* [Foreign Capital in Russian Mining Industry]. Петроград.
- Кардашов, Юрий. 2008. *Восстание. Броненосец “Потёмкин” и его команда* [The Revolt. Battleship “Potemkin” and his crew]. Москва: Дом печати-ВЯТКА.
- Коновалов, Владимир. 1958. *Иностранная коллегия* [Foreign Collegium]. Одесса: Одесское областное издательство.
- Коновалов, Владимир. 1960. *Краткая характеристика источников и литературы, использованных автором для написания книги “Герои одесского подполья”* [Short Summary of the Sources and Literature Used by Author for Writing the Book “Heroes of Odessa’s Underground”]. Одесса: Одесское книжное издательство.
- Крестьянников, Валерий (ред.). 2005. *Севастополь: Хроника революции и гражданской войны 1917–1920 гг.* [Sevastopol: a Chronicle of Revolution and Civil War, years 1917–1920]. Симферополь: Государственный Комитет Архивов Украины, Государственный Архив города Севастополя.
- Ленин, Владимир. 1971. *Развитие капитализма в России, Полное собрание сочинений, Т. 3* [The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Complete works, T. 3], Москва: Издательство политической литературы.
- Мельниченко, Владимир. 1988. *Расстреляна в Одессе* [Shoot in Odessa]. Киев: Молодь.
- Мигальский [Елин], В. 1921. *Воспоминания, Выпуск I* [Memoirs. Series I]. Одесса: Всеукраинское государственное издательство.
- Муру, Г. Н. (ред.). 2011. *История отечественного военного судоремонта* [History of the Domestic Military Ship-Repairing Industry]. Санкт-Петербург: Гангут.
- Найда, Сергей (ред.). 1958. *История города-героя Севастополя, Часть II, 1917–1954* [History of the Hero-City of Sevastopol, Part II, 1917–1954]. Киев: Издательство академии наук Украинской ССР 1958.
- Платонов, Алексей. 1925. *Черноморский флот в революции 1917 г. и адмирал Колчак* [Black Sea Fleet in Revolution of a year 1917 and admiral Kolchak]. Ленинград: Редакционно-издательский отдел Морского ведомства.
- Рябченко, Петр. 2006. “Деньги Белых армий: регионы, эмитенты”. *Историко-географічні дослідження в Україні* [Historic and Geographic Studies in Ukraine] 9: 327–346.

- Смолин, А. В. 2012. *Два адмирала: А. И. Непенин и А. В. Колчак в 1917 г.* [Two admirals: A. I. Nerenin and A. V. Kolčak in 1917]. Санкт-Петербург: “ДМИТРИЙ БУЛАНИН”.
- Соболев, А. А. (ред.). 1925. *Гражданская война. Боевые действия на морях, речных и озерных системах, Т. III, Iugo-zapad* [Civil War. Sea, River and Lake systems warfare, T. III., South-West]. Ленинград: Редакционно-издательский отдел Морского ведомства.
- Трегубов, Соломон. 1904. *Опыт изучения в санитарном отношении быта железнодорожных служащих в пределах Курско-Харьково-Севастопольской железной дороги* [Experience of a Study on the Sanitary Conditions of the Railroad Workers Daily Life within the Limits of Kursk-Kharkov-Sevastopol Railroad]. Харьков: типо-лит. Л. А. Цедербаума.
- Куліков, В. О. 2019. *Підприємства й суспільство в заводських і шахтарських поселеннях Донбасу та Придніпров'я в 1870–1917.* [Enterprises and Society in the Factory and Mining Settlements of the Donbas and the Dnipropetrovsk Region in 1870–1917]: Харків: ХНУ імені В. Н. Каразіна.
- Шуст, Р. М. 2009. *Нумізматика: історія грошового обігу та монетної справи в Україні: навчальний посібник* [Numismatics: History of the Money Circulation and Coining in Ukraine: Manual]. Київ: Знання.

Open Access Publications - Bibliothèque de l'Université de Genève
Creative Commons Licence 4.0




Archives Pictures



Sevastopol: The battleship “Mirabeau” aground (BDIC/VAL TIR 01 (163)).

Source: CNRS : UMR 8058, Bibliothèque Jean Maitron, fonds d'archives



Sevastopol: On the Mirabeau, removal of an armour plate (BDIC/VAL TIR 01 (166)).

Source: CNRS : UMR 8058, Bibliothèque Jean Maitron, fonds d'archives



Sevastopol: On the Mirabeau, removal of the cannons in the presence of Russian workers and French sailors, and ... a rooster. Source: CHS, 5-AM-2B2 Le Mirabeau, s.d.